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Racial Hatred: A Comparative Analysis of
the Hate Crime Laws of the United States
and Germany
Charles Lewis Nier III*
I. Introduction
On the night of October 29, 1993, several members of the U.S. luge
team went to a pub to celebrate a teammate's birthday.' The team was
in Oberhof, Germany, a small town about 150 miles southwest of Berlin,
to train for the World Cup tour and the 1994 Winter Olympic games.2
Shortly after arriving at the bar, Duncan Kennedy was alerted to the3
possibility of trouble when two skinheads motioned to the Americans.
Thus, Kennedy suggested to Robert Pipkins, his African-American
roommate, that they should leave the pub.4 Just as the group was
preparing to leave, a group of fifteen skinheads marched into the pub
wearing leather boots and jackets adorned with swastikas.5 The
skinheads moved behind Pipkins and began making monkey sounds while
shouting "Nigger raus [get out]." Several of Pipkins' teammates hustled
him outside while Kennedy tried to facilitate the escape by blocking the
door.7 The skinheads approached Kennedy chanting "Sieg Heil, Heil
Hitler" and drove him out to the pub's parking lot.8 After being
surrounded by the skinheads, Kennedy was punched and kicked several
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1. Richard Hoffer, Get Up, Stand Up: U.S. Luger Duncan Kennedy Refused to Take a
Skinhead Attack on a Teammate Lying Down, and Now He Won't Give up the Fight, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 13, 1993, at 56. A luge is a small sled on which the driver lies on his back
sliding down an ice chute at speeds of up to 75 m.p.h. Id. The luge is propelled down the chute
by gravity and centrifugal force. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Hoffer, supra note 1, at 56. Duncan Kennedy is considered the best luger in the United
States and among the top three in the world. Id. Robert Pipkins won the 1992 world junior title.
Id. At the XVII Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, Kennedy on his fourth and final run
crashed on the thirteenth of sixteen turns and failed to medal. Leigh Montville, Hitting the Wall:
Speeding After a Medal, U.S. Hopeful Duncan Kennedy Slid Out of Control and Crashed,SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 21, 1994, at 30.
5. Hoffer, supra note I, at 56.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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times. 9 As a result, Kennedy suffered facial and body cuts and bruises
to his rib cage.' °
Later that evening, Kennedy returned to the bar with the police to
identify his assailants." After nearly being attacked again, he was able
to identify three of the skinheads who had assaulted him. 2 Two of the
accused, twenty-one-year-old Silvio Eschrich and sixteen-year-old Tino
Voelkel were tried as juveniles. Nevertheless, both were convicted and
sentenced to stiff prison sentences. 3 Eschrich was sentenced to spend
two years and eight months in prison, while Mr. Voelkel was sentenced
to one year.' 4 Both had been known to the police as potentially violent
right-wing extremists and were on probation for previous offenses."
This incident was denounced throughout Germany, and the depiction
of an American as a victim seemed to galvanize the press.' 6 However,
this attack is representative of the resurgence of hate crimes in both the
United States and Germany. Generally, a hate crime is a crime
committed against someone by reason of their race, religion, national
origin, or sexual orientation of another person or group.' 7 Hate crimes
are not unique to the United States and Germany. At present, hate
crimes, especially hate crimes based upon ethnicity, are seen throughout
the world, most notably in Rwanda and Bosnia.' 8 Still, given the United
States' history of slavery and racial discrimination and Germany's Nazi
past, these two countries are often the focus of attention with regard to
hate crimes. Indeed, in response to the recent hate crime resurgence,

9. Stephen Kinzer, Germans Jailedin Attack on Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1994, at 3A
[hereinafter Germans Jailed in Attack]. Kennedy described the events as follows: "They started
punching me, and several times I fell down. They kept kicking me. I almost got away four times,
but they kept pulling me back. Eventually I got away and ran back to the hotel." Id.
10. Stephen Kinzer, Racist Attack on Americans Upsets Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993,
at 8A.
11. Hoffer, supra note 1, at 57.
12. Id.
13. Germans Jailed in Attack, supra note 9, at 3A. German law allows judges the discretion
to apply the juvenile code to defendants up to the age of 21. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Attempting to send a message to other skinheads, Judge Wolfgang Feld-Gerdes stated
the following during his sentencing of the two: "Those who don't listen must be made to feel, and
so must go to jail." Id. Five other skinheads are being investigated and may be prosecuted later.
Germans Jailed in Attack supra note 9, at 3A.
16. Hoffer, supra note 1, at 57.
17. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
18. At the end of 1994, members of the Hutu tribe massacred more than 500,000 of the Tutsi
people in Rwanda. Kenneth Auchincloss, Bugler Sound Retreat, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1995, at 26.
During Bosnia's three-year civil war, Serb militia have killed close to a million Bosnian Muslims.
Dick Kirschten, No Refuge, 26 NAT'L L.J. 37 (1994).
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there is renewed scrutiny of the legal methods adopted to deter and
punish the commission of such crimes in both countries.
Accordingly, this article will present a comparative analysis of the
criminal sanctions enacted by both the United States and Germany to
combat hate crimes. The article will first examine the recent surge of
hate crimes in Germany in Part II. Part III will then present a summary
of the German legal system, including both a review of the origins of the
German legal system and the modem German Criminal Code and its
criminal sanctions of hate crimes. The U.S. hate crime jurisprudence will
be analyzed, in Part IV. Particular focus will be placed on two recent
Supreme Court decisions, namely IRA. V. v. St. Paul9 and Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.2" Part V extends this analysis to include an examination of the
international human rights documents and institutions as a possible
alternative source for criminal sanctions of hate crimes. In particular,
emphasis will be placed upon the relevant provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2 and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination22 and the
implementation of these provisions by the United States and Germany.
Finally, in Part VI, this article will offer some thoughts and proposals on
the future of hate crime jurisprudence in Germany and the United States.
II. The Resurgence of Hate Crimes and Right Extremism in Germany
In the last several years, Germany has witnessed a startling increase
in the number of violent crimes associated with right-wing extremism.
In 1990, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the German
domestic intelligence agency, reported 375 acts of violence by right wing
extremists.
In 1991, the number of violent acts rose dramatically to
1483, with three deaths.24 In 1992, the number of violent acts continued
to increase to 2285 incidents, with seventeen deaths. 25 Statistics in 1993
reflect 2,232 hate crimes.26

19. __ U.S. ___ 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
20. __ U.S..__, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
22. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106(xx), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Agenda Item 58, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2106 (1966) [hereinafter
Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination].
23. Tamara Jones, Germany's Troubles: The Third Reich Motto 'Germany For Germans' Is
Once Again The Rallying Cry: ForeignersAre The Target: This Time Can The HatredBe Stopped,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993 (Magazine), at 16.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Dan Freedman, Anti-Crime League Sought with FormerSoviet Bloc, THREE STAR EDITION,
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Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the violence is the dramatic rise
27
in the use of weapons in the commission of these violent crimes.
Crimes involving the use of weapons such as as firearms, incendiary
devices and explosives, rose from 383 in 1991 to 701 in 1992.28 These
statistics are indicative of the dramatic surge in hate crimes in Germany
committed by right-wing extremists.
An equally disturbing aspect of this phenomenon is the intense
involvement of young people. German authorities estimate that there are
42,500 right wing extremists active in the country. 9 Those extremists
considered dangerous number approximately 6500 with more than seventy
percent of them teenagers. 30 Further, in 1992, of the 894 people
arrested, questioned, and eventually charged or released in connection
with hate crimes, only eighteen were over the age of thirty.' Thus, not
only are the number of hate crimes dramatically increasing, they wear the
face of a disaffected youth.
An explanation for the rise of right wing extremist violence lies in
a series of interrelated factors. Foremost among these factors are the
economic difficulties associated with unification and a dramatic rise in the
number of asylum seekers. Upon unification, eastern Germany underwent
an economic collapse. Nearly three million jobs have disappeared since
unification and approximately forty percent of the eastern labor force is
unemployed. 32 In addition to unemployment, there is shortage of
housing, a tripling of rents, and a rapid increase in crime rates.33 These
factors, combined with a right wing extremist sentiment, have produced
a volatile environment in which foreigners are utilized as a scapegoat for
the economic woes of Germany.
Much of the anti-foreigner sentiment may be traced to Germany's
asylum laws. Following World War II, as part of West Germany's
punishment for the Holocaust,34 the 1949 constitution established a
liberal asylum law that provided that "[p]ersons persecuted on political
grounds shall enjoy the right to asylum., 35 The right to asylum included

June 29, 1994, at A3. Since Germany's reunification in October 1990, there have been 30 biasrelated murders. Id. This represents an average of 7.7 murders per year. Id.
27. Thorn Shanker, German Gun Show Is Like A Dreamland to Neo-Nazi Skinheads, HOUSTON
CHRON., Feb. 24, 1993, at 10A.
28. Id.
29. Jones, supra note 23, at 18.
30. Id.
31. Shanker, supra note 27, at 10A.
32. Daniel Benjamin Berlin, Foreigners Go Home!, TIME, Nov. 23, 1992, at 48.
33. Id.
34. Jones, supra note 23, at 17.
35. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 16(2) (F.R.G.), reprintedin THE CONSTITUTION OF
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the right to receive food and shelter while German judges assessed each
individual's claim of political persecution.36 This policy resulted in
numerous immigrants claiming political persecution, even though only
about five percent who claimed asylum were ultimately adjudged victims
of political persecution." In addition, the German government's process
of adjudicating claims took several years, and cost approximately 9,000
dollars a year per individual.38
Initially, the number of asylum seekers was rather modest. For
example, in 1972 slightly more than 5000 people sought political asylum
in Germany.39 However, the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the ethnic
war in the former Yugoslavia dramatically increased the number of
asylum seekers throughout Europe and, in particular, Germany."
Indeed, the number of asylum seekers in Germany rose from 121,000 in
1989 to 438,000 in 1992."' The trend continued in the first four months
of 1993, with the arrival of 161,320 asylum seekers.42
In response to the flood of asylum seekers and the rise of hate
crimes, on May 28, 1993, the German Parliament voted to sharply limit
its policies on political asylum. 3 The law provides that any individual
who comes from a country Germany deems free of political persecution
will be immediately sent home upon entry to Germany." The law went
into effect in July, 1993 and immediately reduced the number of asylum
seekers entering the country. In June, asylum seekers entering Germany
totaled 31,123. 4 ' The number fell to 20,658 in July and 14,521 in
August. 46

The number rose slightly in October to 16,660, but it

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 233 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).

36. Each individual's claim was judged on a case-by-case basis to afford the individual due
process rights. Jones, supra note 23, at 17.
37. Stephen Kinzer, Bonn Parliament Votes Sharp Curb on Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1993, at IA [hereinafter Asylum Seekers].
38. Jones, supra note 23, at 17.
39. Asylum Seekers, supra note 37, at IA.
40. Paul Lewis, Stoked By Ethnic Conflict: Refugee Numbers Swell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1993, at 6A.
41. Id.
42. Robert L. Koenig, Shadow of Violence Over Germany: Bonn Government Has Failed to
Curb Right-Wing Attacks, ST. LOUIS POST-DIs., June 6, 1993, at 4B.
43. Id.
44. Asylum Seekers, supra note 37, at IA. The Interior Minister of Germany, Rudolf Seiters,
explained that asylum seekers will only be returned if there is "no danger of torture or inhuman
treatment." Id.
45. STAR TRia., Sept. 7, 1993, at 4A.
46. Id.
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represented a two-thirds decrease in comparison to the totals from the
same period the previous year.47
While the new law is certainly reducing the number of asylum
seekers allowed entry into Germany,. it is uncertain if it will have the
effect of curbing right-wing extremist violence. Statistics from the Office
for the Protection of the Constitution reported that the violence actually
increased in the two months following passage of the law on May 28,
1993." In addition, the law has no effect upon the estimated 1.5
million asylum-seekers already in Germany,4 9 nor upon the 6.5 million
foreigners living in Germany.5" Such facts tend to suggest that the
number of hate crimes in Germany will not be diminished simply by
enforcing more stringent asylum laws. Thus, it becomes necessary to
examine Germany's criminal laws to determine if they serve as an
additional method of combatting hate crimes.
First, however, it is necessary to explore the history of the German
legal system in order to gain an understanding of thejudiciary's historical
reaction to right-wing extremism and hate crimes.
Ill. The German Legal System
A. The Origins of the German Legal System
Early German history was marked by periods of both factionalism
and unity.5" As such, the early German legal system consisted of both
local custom law and the informal systems of legal administration that
were established by Germanic tribes and migrating tribes from the
east.52 This lack of a formal unified legal system facilitated the
conditions that made it possible for the adoption of the Roman system of
law when Germany became a part of the Holy Roman Empire in the late

47. Judy Dempsey, Asylum Seekers Decline, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1993, at 2.
48. German Violence Rises Sharply: Anti-Asylum Law Fails to Stem Attacks on Foreigners,
CHICAGO TRiB., July 31, 1993, at 13.
49. Koenig, supra note 42, at 4B.
50. Asylum Seekers, supra note 37, at IA, col. 3.
51. Until 800 A.D. and the reign of Charles the Great (Charlemagne), Germany consisted of
several regions of individual tribes. During his reign, Charlemagne unified these tribes and they
became part of his reestablished Western Roman Empire. NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LAW & LEGAL
SYSTEM 7-10 (1993).
52. Id. at 7, 10-Il. For more information concerning early Germany and its legal system, see
FRANCIS OWEN, THE GERMANIC PEOPLE (1960); E.A. THOMPSON, THE EARLY GERMANS (1965);
MALCOLM TODD, THE NORTHERN BARBARIANS !00 BC-AD 300(1987); SIMEON L. GUTERMAN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF PERSONALITY OF LAWS IN THE GERMANIC KINGDOMS OF WESTERN EUROPE FROM
THE FIFTH TO THE ELEVENTH CENTURY (1990).
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Soon, Roman law replaced the fragmentary local
Middle Ages."
custom law.54 Nevertheless, the Holy Roman Empire and its Roman
law was not assimilated to such an extent as to impose a strong German
legal system. 55
The decline of the Holy Roman Empire following the Thirty Years
War was officially consummated with Napoleon's conquest and
occupation of the region.56 During his reign, Napoleon imposed the
French civil code upon the occupied states." Following the downfall
of Napoleon, however, Germany again existed as a loose federation of
states with no central legal system until 1871,58 when rapid progress was
made in achieving legal unity through the development of a variety of
codes, including: (1) the 1871 penal code; (2) the 1877 code of civil and
criminal procedure; (3) the Organization of the Courts Act; (4) the Law
on Attorneys and the commercial and (5) the competition codes of
Ultimately, these codes were unified in the Burgerliches
1879.5'
Gesetzbuch (BGB) civil code, adopted in 1896.6' This new code came
into force on January 1, 1900 and remains the basis of German civil
law.6 The codification of the BGB in the 19th and 20th centuries was
joined by other legal developments of the 20th century, most notably
those establishing the Weimar Republic and Hitler's National Socialist
regime. Therefore, to obtain a full understanding of the German legal
tradition, an examination of such legal developments is necessary.62

53. Charlemagne's successors could not maintain the unity of the Roman empire. Accordingly,
Germany returned to its fragmented state, where "emperors ruled a federation of areas or realms
rather than a united realm." FOSTER, supra note 51, at 10. Such regions were later unified as a
loose federation of states under the Holy Roman Empire in the thirteenth century and the Holy
Roman Empire of the German Nation in the fifteenth century. Id. at 13-17.
54. Id. at 13. See also J. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC
ERA (1990).
55. FOSTER, supra note 51, at 15.
56. The Thirty Years War was fought from 1618-1648. Id. at 18. Napoleon conquered the
German region in the early 1800s. Id.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.

61.
62.

FOSTER, supra note 51, at 21.
See infra part IlI.B.

FOSTER, supra note 5 I, at 21.
60. Id. See generally MICHAEL JOHN, POLITICS AND THE LAw IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
GERMANY: THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL CODE (1989); H.W. KOCH, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENJrUlES (1984).
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B. The Legal Systems of the Weimar Republic and NationalSocialism
1. Weimar Republic.-Following the defeat of Germany in World
War I, the Western allies attempted to radically alter the German state
and government from its autocratic and monarchial past.63 Specifically,
the Weimar Republic was established as a means of establishing "a
democratic federal republic guaranteeing rights to prevent war again,
and ... set up a dualist division of powers in government."64 However,
this initial German experiment with democracy met with a disastrous fate.
This failure can be attributed to a wide range of factors, including: (1)
the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s; (2) the perceived
injustices of the Treaty of Versailles; and (3) the inherent instability of
the constitutional framework of the new government.65 Perhaps most
significant in the Weimar's demise was article 48 of the Constitution,
which has been described as the "suicide clause."6' This article gave the
President the power to make laws in cases of emergencies in order to

63. FOSTER, supra note 51, at 24.
64. Id. The Weimar Republic maintained a number of criminal provisions for hate crimes and
anti-Semitic expression including:
I. Incitement to Class Struggle (Paragraph 130 Criminal Code):
Whoever publicly incites different classes of the population to violent actions against
one another in a way that jeopardizes the public peace will be punished with a fine
of 600 marks or with a prison term of up to two years.
2. Insult (Paragraph 186 and 187 Criminal Code):
(186) Whoever asserts or spreads a fact in relation to another person that serves to
make the other contemptible or demeaned in the public view will, if this fact is not
demonstrably true, be punished with a fine or with arrest or with prison up to one
year, and if the insult is done publicly or through the spread of literature, pictures,
or representations, with a fine or prison term of up to two years.
(187) Whoever against his better knowledge asserts or spreads a fact in relation to another
person that makes him contemptible in the public view or that serves to threaten his credit
will be punished with prison for a term of up two years on account of defamatory insult,
or if the defamation is done publicly or through the spreading of literature, pictures, or
representations, with pilson for not under one month. If extenuating circumstances are
present, the penalty can be reduced to one day in prison or a fine.
reprinted in Cyril Levitt, Under the Shadow of Weimar: What Are the Lessons for the Modern
Democracies? in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT

INSIX COUNTRIES 16, 17 (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993). See also Cyril Levitt, The
Prosecution of Anlisemites by the Courts in the Weimar Republic: Was Justice Served? 36 LEO
BAECK INST. Y.B. 151-67 (1991); Cyril Levitt, Racial Incitement and the Law: The Case of the
Weimar Republic in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE CHARTER (D. Schneiderman ed., 1991); A.
HEARST, WHEN JUSTICE WAS NOT DONE: JUDGES INTHE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, 14 WIENER LIBRARY
BULL. I (1960); U. Beer, The Protection of Jewish Civil Rights in the Weimar Republic in LEO
BAECK INST. Y.B. (A. Paucker ed., 1988).
65. FOSTER, supra note 5I, at 23-29.
66. Id. at 26.
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defend the Constitution and constitutional rights." The President made
liberal use of this power, and thus, it soon replaced the power and role
of the parliamentary legislature.68 This, in turn, eroded the separation
of powers principle, thereby removing the basis of the democracy.6 9 In
the end, the Weimar Republic was unsuccessful because "too few wanted
democracy and approved of the prerequisites essential to a democratic
state's establishment: liberalism, individualism, pluralism, equality and
tolerance."70
2. National Socialism under the Third Reich.-The collapse of the
Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler's National Socialism under the
Third Reich marked the failure of democracy and the successful advent
of right extremism in Germany. It is important to examine the National
Socialist philosophical conception of the law, as it reveals a degree of
insight to the resurgence of hate crimes in Germany. The Third Reich
did not establish a new constitution.7 Rather, it radically altered the
legal system by simply reworking or ignoring the existing constitution.72
These alterations were based upon the underlying philosophies of the
National Socialist state. The Nazi philosophical conception of the role
of law within the state was as follows:
[A]II laws should work in favour of the state and that the Fiuhrer's
law was supreme. Law was conceived now no longer in terms of the
rights of the individual but as the rights of the people as determined
by the state. Whatever was good for 7 the state was to be achieved,
regardless of the right or morals of it.

1

In essence, "[t]he right of the National Socialist state totally
encompasse[d] the early existence of man, and it [was] limited neither by
historical traditions nor by individual constitutional and human rights. 74
This doctrine allowed the state to dismiss democratic order, namely
notions of equality, individualism, and liberalism.
In addition to facilitating the dismissal of individual rights, National
Socialism became a vehicle for the principle that some people were

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Arthur Kaufmann, National Socialism and German Jurisprudencefrom 1933 to 1945, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 1629, 1632-33 (1988).
71. FOSTER, supra note 51, at 26.
72., Id.
73. Id.
74. Kaufmann, supra note 70, at 1635 (citing ERIK WOLF, RICHTIGES RECHT IN
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN STA"TE 23 (1934)).
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entitled to less rights than others. 75 This principle was reiterated in a
1936 decision by the Reichsgericht,the pre-1945 German supreme court,
which held that full rights extended only to those of German origin.76
As the Court explained:
[F]undamental restrictions placed on aliens under former laws are
renewed, and ideas are again taken up, which were recognized earlier
based upon the differentiation between those with full legal
responsibility and those persons with fewer rights."
This doctrine had obvious unfortunate implications, namely that
people believed to have less rights, artfremde (those foreign) including
Jews, could be legally persecuted.78 When this legal doctrine was
combined with the Nazi view of the artfremde as an enemy of the people,
the consequences became all too clear and deadly. The Nazi movement
could pursue its persecution as a method of preserving the state from
foreign individual infiltration with the support of a law that deemed such
artftemde as having lesser rights than Germans. Essentially, the National
Socialists portrayed themselves as "heros," those saving the German state.
As scholars have explained:
The National Socialist movement took the matter of the solution of
the Jewish problem firmly in hand, not in the sense of stock antiSemitism, but in the knowledge that only in this way could they put
a stop to foreign infiltration of the German nation, which had become
particularly blatant in the aftermath of the war. These legislative
measures, whose implementation certainly in individual cases was not
possible without severity, had to be implemented with tact, but also
with responsible firmness. These measures were not directed chiefly
against the Jews as a people, but were only a necessary defensive
measure against the threat of foreign infiltration of the German
nation.79
This logic resulted in the loss millions of lives under Hitler's reign.
Startlingly, a similar method of logical analysis is often utilized by
present day right-wing extremist groups in their defense of hate crimes.
To gain a better understanding of these problems in present-day
Germany, it is necessary to examine the post-World War II German legal

75.

Id. at 1636.

76. Id. (citing 91 SEUFFERT'S ARCHIV FOR ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER OBERSTEN GERICHTE IN DEN
DEUTSHEN 65 (1936)).

77.

Kaufmann, supra note 70, at 1636.

78.

Id. at 1641.

79.

Kaufman, supranote 70, at 1642 (citing OTTO KOELLREUTTER, -NOM SINN UND WESEN DER

NATIONALEN REVOLTION 28-29 (1933)).

HATE CRIMES

system, in particular its focus upon basic constitutional rights. An
analysis of such rights will provide the necessary basis for analyzing the
current criminal punishment of hate crimes.
C. The Modern German Legal System
On May 23, 1949, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany was promulgated to serve as the cornerstone of a democratic
state designed to protect individual liberty.8"
Accordingly, the
Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, is patterned upon the tradition of Western
constitutionalism and is a direct historical reaction to the disastrous
Weimar Republic and Third Reich." The Basic Law regulates two
types of rights and relations.8 2 The first type, the Basic Laws, pertain
to the rights of individuals and the state. 83 The Basic Laws are
characterized by many of the classic human rights found in the U.S. Bill
of Rights.84 The second type, the Rights to a Free Democratic Order,
concern the rights of governmental organs, the organization of the state,
and the relationships between the various state organs.85
1. Basic Rights.-The Basic Rights are enumerated in the first
twenty articles of the Basic Law and are listed as a system of values and
rights.8 6 Article 1, titled Protection of Human Dignity, establishes a
foundation for individual rights with the following proclamations:
(1) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect
it shall be the duty of all state authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of
peace and of justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law. 87
80.

Ulrich Karpen, Preface, to THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:

ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE

BASIC LAW 7 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).
81. Id.
82. FOSTER, supra note 51, at 105.
83. Id. at 106.
84. The U.S. Bill of Rights is embodied in the 25 amendments to the U.S. Constitution. U.S.
CONST. amends. I-XXV.
85. FOSTER, supra note 51, at 105-06.
86. Gtlnter Durig, An Introduction to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany in THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND
PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 13 (Ulrich Karpen ed.,
1988).
87. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], supra note 35, art. I.
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This article affirmatively establishes that individual rights are valid laws,
not mere proclamations, as was the case with the Weimar Republic."
Further, the strength of these rights is compounded by the binding nature
of these rights upon the executive, legislature, and judiciary. 9 The
result is that laws are only valid subject to the basic rights. 9 Such a
tenet stands in direct opposition to the historic German conception of the
law, namely that basic rights were only valid subject to the laws.9 ' In
short, the basic rights became inalienable and thereby represent a form of
natural law.
Article 2, titled Rights of Liberty, acts in a complementary fashion
to article 1, by providing that "[e]veryone shall have the right to the free
development of his personality in so far as he does not violate the rights
92
of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code.
This general proclamation serves as a basis for other basic rights, such as
the freedom of faith and creed (article 4), the freedom of expression
(article 5), the freedom of assembly (article 8), and the freedom of
movement (article 11).93
Article 3 provides for equality before the law and is similar to
articles 1 and 2, as its principles may be also seen throughout the Basic
Law.94 It is composed of the following three basic parts:
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
(2) Men and women shall have equal rights.
(3) No one may be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, his
parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith,
or his religious or political opinions.9"
These principles have been extended to other articles such as
(1) paragraph 5 of article 6, which grants illegitimate children the same
opportunities as those enjoyed by other legitimate children; (2) paragraph

88. Durig, supra note 86, at 13.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], supra note 35, art. 2, § I.
93. Durig, supra note 86, at 13. It is important to note that the right to freedom of expression
is limited "by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection of youth,
and by the right to inviolability of personal honour." GRUND EsETz IGGI, supra note 35, art. 5.
94. Durig, supra note 86, at 14. See also T. Wurtenberger, Equality inThe Constitution ofthe
Federal Republic of Germany, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE

BASIC LAW 67 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).

95.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG], supra note 35, art. 3.
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1 of article 19, which stipulates that no law that applies solely to an
individual case; (3) paragraphs I to 3 of article 33, which state that all
Germans have equal political status; (4) article 38, which mandates that
everyone has the same voting rights; (5) article 101, which directs that
while there may be no extraordinary courts, there is a right to a lawful
97
judge. 96 Furthermore, article 3 applies to all, including non-nationals.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge article 79, which provides for
amendments to the Basic Law. Article 79(3) protects articles 1 through
20 from change or amendment.9" As a result, amendments to the
Constitution that seek to change these articles are impermissible
regardless of the majority in Parliament." Further, the courts may not
alter the rights by interpretations inconsistent with their original
intent.'00 Thus, these rights represent the "apex of the hierarchical
pyramid of legal rights in Germany. They have precedence over all other
0
law."' '
2. Rights to a Free Democratic Order.-The preservation of a free
democracy is deemed essential to preserve basic rights. Therefore, the
German Constitution includes provisions designed to protect the free
democratic order. The Basic Rights are directly violated by acts
constituting hate crimes, and one may further assert that such crimes also
violate the Rights to a Free Democratic Order.
For example, article 21(1) provides for the free establishment of
political parties.0 2 This right, however, is restricted by granting the

96. Durig, supra note 86, at 14.
97. FoSTER, supra note 51, at 120.
98. Id. at 114. Article 79 states:
(1) This Basic Law can be amended only by laws which expressly amend or supplement
the text thereof. In respect of international treaties the subject of which is a peace
settlement, the preparation of a peace settlement, or the abolition of an occupation regime,
or which are designed to serve the defence of the Federal Republic, it shall be sufficient,
for the purpose of clarifying that the provisions of this Basic Law do not preclude the
conclusion and entry into force of such treaties, to effect a supplementation of the text of
this Basic Law confined to such clarification.
(2) Any such law shall require the affirmative vote of two thirds of the members of the
Bundestag and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.
(3) Amendments of this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Laender,
the participation on principle of the Laender in legislation, or the basic principles laid
down in Articles 1 and 20, shall be inadmissible.
GRUNDOESEZ [GG], supra note 35, art 79.
99. FoSTER, supra note 5 I, at 114.
100. Id. at 115.
101. Id. at 114.
102. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], supra note 35, art. 21. Article 21 provides in pertinent part:
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Federal Constitutional Court the power to declare unconstitutional any
parties that "seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or
to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany."' 3 This
limitation may be used to ban right-wing extremist political parties
deemed a threat to the democratic order.
Additionally, article 9 establishes that "[a]ll Germans shall have the
right to form associations and societies.' ' 4 This right is limited,
however, because "[a]ssociations, the purposes or activities of which
conflict with criminal laws or which are directed against the constitutional
0 5
order or concept of international understanding, are prohibited.'
Such a restriction may deny right-wing extremist groups the right to
association, as any hate crime activities may constitute a threat to the
democratic order.
Finally, both articles 21 and 9 are supplemented by article 18, which
deals with forfeiture of basic rights.0 6 Specifically, article 18 provides
that if certain Basic Rights are abused "to combat the free democratic
basic order," then they are forfeited.' 7 The rights subject to this
provision are generally related to freedom of expression of opinion,
including (1) freedom of press; (2) freedom of teaching; (3) freedom of
assembly; (4) privacy of posts and telecommunications; or (5) the right
to asylum. 0 8 Thus, an individual or group who attempts to use these
rights to commit a hate crime may have these rights suspended pursuant

(1)The political parties shall participate in the forming of the political will of the people.
They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic
principles. They must publicly account for the sources and spending of their funds as
well as for their financial resources...
(2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behaviour [sic] of their adherents, seek
to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the
Federal Republic of Germany, shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court
shall decide on the question of constitutionality.
Id.
103.
104.
105.

Id. art. 21, § 2.
Id. art. 9, § I.
Id. art. 9, § 2.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG], supra note 35, art. 18.
107. Id. Specifically, article 18 provides that:
Whoever abuses freedom of expression of opinion, in particular freedom of the press
(paragraph (1) of Article 5), freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), freedom
of assembly (Article 8), freedom of association (Article 9), privacy of posts and
telecommunications (Article 10), property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (paragraph
(2) of Article 16) in order to combat the free democratic basic order, shall forfeit these
basic rights. Such forfeiture and the extent thereof shall be pronounced by the Federal
Constitutional Court.
108. Id.

106.
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to article 18, as hate crimes are arguably a threat to the free democratic
order.
D. German CriminalLaw and Hate Crimes
Following World War II, the Allies believed that nationalism and
militarism would effectively be eliminated by trying German war
criminals and through "de-Nazification" of the German people. 1" 9 Such
a belief was embodied in the Laws of Liberation passed by the Council
of Provinces in the American Zone and approved by the military
government in March 1946."'0
Germany adopted the Laws of
Liberation into its Basic Law in article 139, which states: "The
legislation enacted for the Liberation of the German People from National
Socialism and Militarism shall not be affected by the provisions of this
Basic Law.""' This provision ensured that the Basic Law did not
supersede the ideals expressed in the Laws of Liberation." 2 Despite the
Laws of Liberation and article 139, right extremism was not destroyed or
eradicated for a number of reasons, including the advent of the Cold War,
the failure to successfully complete de-Nazification, and the inability of
Germany to comprehend the Nazi legacy." 13 As such, Germany is
experiencing a revitalization of this right wing extremism, often
manifesting itself in the form of violent hate crimes.
The German Criminal Code has several provisions designed to
oppose National Socialist and racist activities. These provisions are
utilized against both right extremism and hate crimes to ensure the basic
rights and to protect the democratic state of law and public order." 4
Accordingly, these provisions will be discussed in a two-part analysis.
1. The German Criminal Code and Right Extremism.-Several
provisions of the German criminal code address political parties. Such
provisions indirectly address hate crimes because political parties are a

109. Juliane Wetzel, The Judicial Treatment of Incitement against Ethnic Groups and of the
Denial of National Socialist Mass Murder in the Federal Republic of Germany in UNDER THE
SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES 83 (Louis
Greenspan & Cyrill Levitt eds., 1993).
110. Id.
111. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], supra note 35, art. 139.
112. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 84.
113. Id. at 83-84.
114. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 87. The German Criminal Code is divided into both a general
part and a special part. FOSTER, supra note 51, at 167. The general part, found in sections 1-79,
contains rules applicable to all offenses and underlying assumptions of the code. Id. The special
part, found in sections 80-358, gives detailed descriptions for individual offenses and the statutory
requirements that must be fulfilled to punish perpetrators for violations. Id.
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primary source of right extremism. Article 86 prohibits the dissemination
of propaganda of an association or a political party that is deemed
unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court or that initiates
propaganda whose content is directed at continuing the efforts of any
former Nationalist Socialist organization. " 5 Such a prohibition applies
only to propaganda whose content is directed against the free democratic
constitutional order or the principle of understanding among peoples,
however. "6
In addition, this prohibition does not apply if the
propaganda (1) is used for education; (2) protects against unconstitutional
actions; (3) promotes art and science; (4) advances research; or (5)
furthers historical purposes." 7 Unfortunately, these exceptions often
allow right extremists to distort or question facts under the guise of
research for historical purposes and thereby escape prosecution.'
Article 86 is supplemented by article 86a, which addresses
dissemination of symbols of political parties proclaimed unconstitutional
under article 86."' The provision defines symbols as "flags, insignia,

115. Article 86 of the Criminal Code states:
(1) Whosoever disseminates or produces for purposes of dissemination within the territory
in which this law applies, maintains a supply of imports into this territory, propaganda
i. of a political party declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court,
or of a political party about which it has been incontestably determined that it is a
substitute organization for such a political party,
2. of an association which it has been incontestably prohibited because it is ranged
against the constitutional order or against the principle of understanding among
peoples, or about which it has been incontestably determined that it is a substitute
organization of such a political party.
3. of a government, association or institution outside the territory in which this law
applies, which is active on behalf of the purposes of the parties or associations
designated under I. and 2., or
4. propaganda whose content are directed at continuing the efforts of a former
National Socialist organization
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.
(2) Propaganda in the sense of Paragraph I are only those writings (§ 11 par. 3) whose
content is directed against the free democratic constitutional order or the principle of
understanding among peoples.
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply if the propaganda or the action serves to advance
political or civil education, to protect against unconstitutional actions, to promote art or
science, to advance research or teaching, to report events of contemporary or historical
interest or other such purposes.
(4) The court may refrain from imposing penalties according to these regulations in cases
when the guilt is modest.
STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [Penal Code] art. 86, reprinted in Wetzel, supra note 109, at 104 n.10.
116. Id. § 1(2).
117. Id. art. 86, § 3.
118. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 88.
119. Article 86a of the Criminal Code states:
(1) Whosoever
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parts of uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting."' 20 This provision is
clearly aimed at items such as SS runes, swastikas and salutes such as
"Heil Hitler."'' The Twenty-First Amendment to the Criminal Code,
passed on June 13, 1985, provides several slight changes to article
86a.122
The amendment extended criminal sanctions to the
manufacturing, storing or promoting
of objects displaying the symbols of
123
unconstitutional organizations.

The exceptions to articles 86 and 86a have been applied in a variety
of manners. For example, the Provincial Court in Karlsruhe held that
model airplanes with swastikas must be confiscated. 24 However, the
prosecuting attorney's office in Frankfurt did not consider the placing of
Nationalist Socialist symbols on toys as criminal, believing that such
symbols serve no propaganda purpose. 25 Similarly, the Bavarian
Ministry of Justice permitted an auction house to sell Nazi memorabilia
because the sale of such objects was "only for scholarly and historical
purposes.' 26
As a result, the exception creates loopholes for
enforcement against right extremism.
Despite the exception, the combination of articles 86 and 86a
provide an excellent vehicle for addressing the threat of right extremism
in the form of political parties. Such articles have their roots in the
historical experience of the Nazi party and therefore are designed to
prevent the emergence of a similar movement. An application of these
provisions to a right extremist group may be seen in an incident involving
the Socialist Reich Party (SRP).

I. within the territory in which this law applies disseminates symbols of one of the
political parties or associations designated in Section 86 para. 1 no.1, 2 and 4 or,
publicly uses them in a meeting or in writings disseminated by him, or
2. produces, maintains a supply or imports into the territory in which represent or
contain these kinds of symbols for dissemination or use in ways specified in
number I
shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.
(2) Symbols in the meaning of para. I are particularly flags, insignia, parts of uniforms,
slogans and forms of greeting.
(3) Article 86 (3) and (4) shall correspondingly apply.
STRAFGESETZBUC- [StGB] [Penal Code] art. 86a, reprintedin Wetzel, supra note 109, at 104-05
n.l .
120. Id. art. 86a, § 2.
121. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 87 (citing Kalinowsky 1985: 153fl).
122. Id. at 99 (citing Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 29, 15 June 1985).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 88.
125. Id.
126. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 88 (citing Ratz 1979:1591).
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In November 1952, the German federal government considered the
SRP the successor of the Nazi party. Thus, it requested the Federal
Constitutional Court to determine whether the SRP was
unconstitutional.' 27 The Court ruled that the party was unconstitutional
and therefore dissolved it and prohibited it from creating similar
institutions. 21 In short, the Court concluded that the SRP was a threat
to the free democratic order.
The Court based its decision on a series of interrelated factors. First,
the Court explained that it was necessary to look beyond the party's
platforms and aims, as these could be easily disguised. To the contrary,
it was the actual behavior of the party's followers that was of
importance. 29 Second, the Court explained that it suspected the SRP
of attempting to resurrect rightist extremism that "had last been
manifested in National Socialism"' 30 Such an allegation was supported
by the fact that the SRP's leadership was composed of "former 'veteran
fighters' and active National Socialists."' 3' Third, the Court noted that
the SRP had attempted to perpetuate and spread National Socialist
ideology, as evidenced by the group's "loyalty to the Reich" and
"superiority of the German race" principles.' 2 By comparing the
SRP's actions to prior Nazi incidents, the Court deduced that, like the
Nazi party, the SRP desired to destroy the free democratic order and
would utilize "the same circles which had [made] it possible for Hitler to
lead Germany to its ruin."' '
Finally, the Court found the SRP's
slogans and songs evidenced anti-Semitism and violated both human
rights and principles of equality before the law.' 34 Consequently, the
Court classified the SRP as unconstitutional, stripped the SRP leaders of
their legislative assemblies, and seized party property, turning it over for
public use.'35

127. Id. at 84-85. In the provincial elections in Lower Saxony in May 1952, the SRP received
11% of the total votes cast and 16 seats. Id. at 85.
128. Id. at 85.
129. Id.
130. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 85 (quoting Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952, Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerGE] 27 (F.R.G.)).
131. Id. at 85.
132. Id. at 84-85.
133. Id. at 86 (quoting Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952, Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerGE] 43, 52f (F.R.G.)).
134. Id.
135. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 85.
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2. The German Criminal Code and Racial Hatred.-Several
provisions of the German criminal code pertain to racial hatred. First,
article 130 provides in pertinent part:
[W]hoever attacks the human dignity of others disturbs the public
peace by,
1. inciting hatred against sections of the population,
2. calling for violent or arbitrary measures against them, or
3. insulting them, maliciously exposing them to contempt or
slandering them
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment
of not less than three
36
months and not exceeding five years.1
Additionally, article 131 provides for a prison term of up to one year
for the producing, disseminating, exhibiting, or making available to
persons below the age of eighteen, writings that:
incite to [sic] race hatred or which describe cruel or otherwise
inhuman acts of violence against human beings in a manner which
glorifies such acts of violence, or makes them appear harmless, or
represents the cruel and inhuman aspects of such acts in a manner
offending human dignity.'
This article generally affects written material such as hanging posters or
publicly displaying items deemed to incite racial hatred or minimize
violence. 38 Like articles 86 and 86a, this article contains an exception
when the act serves to report on current events or history. 39 As such,
like article 86 and 86a, this exception can often be used by right
40
extremists to avoid criminal liability.
A juvenile court in Frankfurt utilized article 131 in an innovative
manner. The Frankfurt Court found two youths guilty of hanging posters
with National Socialist slogans, such as "Death and extermination to all
foreigners and Jews.' 4 ' As a penalty, the Court instructed the youths
to read a report about Auschwitz and submit an essay on the topic. 142

136. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [Penal Code] art. 130, reprinted in Wetzel, supra note 109, at
105 n.12.
137. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [Penal Code] art. 131, reprinted in Wetzel, supra note 109, at
105 n.13.
138. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 87-88.
139. STRAFGESETZBUCH, [StGB] [Penal Code] art. 131(3), reprinted in Wetzel, supra note 109,
at 105 n.13.
140. See supra notes 115-35 and accompanying text.
141. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 100 (citing Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 October 1979).
142. Id. at 100-01.
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While innovative, this sentence was slight.'4 3 German judges often
issue mild sentences for fear a long prison term will result in the
permanent criminalization of a first offender.'4 4
A third provision is the "lie of Auschwitz" offense. The "lie of
Auschwitz" offense is not a criminal offense, but rather an act of libel
and slander under article 194. 4 ' Article 194 prohibits the trivializing
or denial of Nazi crimes or the crimes of other violent arbitrary
regimes. 4
However, an amendment allows for the criminal
147
prosecution of the "lie of Auschwitz" offense by the state.
Previously, such a charge had8 to originate from a survivor or member of
4
a murdered person's family.1
Article 194 was used in the case of Karl-Franz Muller in the Federal
Court in Karlsruhe. In that case, a Jewish student whose grandfather was
murdered at Auschwitz filed a complaint alleging that his grandfather's
honor had been offended by posters in Muller's garden that proclaimed
the Holocaust was a lie and a "Zionist hoax.' 1 4 9 In ruling for the
student, the court established that "no one can plead for protection by
claiming freedom of speech if that person makes statements denying the

143. Id.
144. Tyler Marshall, German Scales of Justice Seem to Tilt to Right, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993,
at Al.
145. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 99. The first two paragraphs of article 194 provide the
following:
(1) Prosecution for insult shall be instituted only upon petition. When the act is
committed by disseminating or making publicly accessible a writing (Section 1i, para. 3),
or in an assembly or by means of broadcasting, a petition is not required, if the insulted
person was persecuted as a member of a group under the National Socialist or another
violent and arbitrary dominance, if the group is a part of the population and if the insult
is connected with such persecution. However, there shall be no prosecution ex officio if
the injured person opposes it. The opposition passes to the next of kin as specified in
Section 77, para. 2.
(2) If the memory of a deceased person is denigrated, the next of kin as specified in
Section 77, para. 2 have the right to lodge a petition. If the act is committed by
disseminating or by making publicly accessible a writing (Section 1i, para. 3), or in an
assembly or by means of broadcasting, a petition is not required, if the insulted person
was persecuted as a member of a group under National Socialist or another violent and
arbitrary dominance and the denigration is connected with it. However, there shall be no
prosecution ex officio if the person entitled to launch a petition opposes it. The
opposition may not be withdrawn.
GESETZGEBUNGSDIENST JURISTEN ZEITUNG [Legislation Service] Nr. 12, Aug. 9, 1985, reprinted in
Wetzel, supra note 109, at 106 n.18.
146. Id.
147. Wetzel, supra note 109, at 99.
148. Id. The law does not protect Jews from anti-semitic statements in general, but rather
protects all victims of Nazi persecution. Id. at 93.
149. Id. at 91 (citing Judgment of Sept. 18, 1979, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] (F.R.G.)).
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historical fact that Jews were murdered in the 'Third Reich." ' 150 As the
Court stated: "Whoever attempts to deny these events, denies to each and
every one of them [Jews] their value as human beings which they may
rightfully claim as their own."' 5'
E. The Case of Gunter Deckhart and the Future of German Hate
Crimes
A recent decision by the Federal Court in Karlsruhe obfuscated the
judicial application of hate crime laws in Germany. Guenter Deckert,
leader of the rightist National Democratic Party, organized a rally where
Fred Leuchter, an American neo-Nazi, explained to an audience that there
had never been gas chambers at Auschwitz.'5 2 Subsequently, Deckert
translated Leucther's speech and attempted to market it.' 53 Deckert was
convicted of inciting hatred and was given a one-year suspended sentence
and fined approximately $6,000.1"4 Germany's highest court of appeals
reversed this conviction and returned the case to the lower courts. 55
The Court ruled that it was "too much of a generalization" to hold that
publicly repeating another person's denial of the holocaust constituted
inciting racial hatred. 5 6 The Court remanded the case to the lower
courts to examine and establish rules of evidence to determine whether

150. Id. The Court's decision was primarily based on the literature that proclaimed the Holocaust
was a fabrication and not the literature's dispute of the actual numbers murdered. Wetzel, supra note
109, at 91.
151. Id. at 92. An additional possible source for criminal sanctions is § 220a of the Criminal
Code relating to Genocide. Section 220a provides:
(1)Whosoever, with the intention of destroying wholly or partially a national, racial,
religious or ethnic group, willfully
(i) Kills members of such group
(ii) Causes grave physical or mental damage, ... to members of such group,
(iii) Causes such group to live in conditions likely to cause their total or partial
physical destruction,
(iv) Take measures to prevent births within such group,
(v) Transfers children of such group by force to some other group,
shall be guilty of genocide and punished with lifelong imprisonment.
(2) If mitigating circumstances are present in the cases specified in subparagraph (1) (ii)
to (v) above, punishment shall be imprisonment not less than five years.
STRAFGESETZBUCH [Penal Code] [StBG] 220a, reprinted in GENEVA CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
SECOND DECADE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: GLOBAL COMPILATION OF
NATIONAL LEGISLATION AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 94-95 (United Nations ed., 1991).
152. Marjorie Miller, Ruling On HolocaustDenial Is DenouncedIn Germany, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1994, at 1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Craig R. Whitney, German's Race-HatredConvictionIs Reversed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1994, at 13A.
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Deckert was guilty of inciting hatred against part of the population.' 5 7
The Court rejected Mr. Deckert's contention and reaffirmed that the
Holocaust was a historical fact that did not need to be established by
evidence in Holocaust-denial cases. 158
The decision has been widely condemned throughout Germany as
As such,
narrowing the definition of inciting racial hatred. 5 9
right
prosecute
to
more
difficult
make
it
authorities fear the ruling will
60
violence.
racial
advocate
that
extremists
IV. The U.S. Legal System and Hate Crimes
A. The Rising Trend of Hate Crimes in the United States
Much like Germany, hate crimes in the United States hold a special
significance, in part due to the historical background of the United States.
A strange dichotomy exists in the United States. No country in the world
has embraced more immigrants into its home. 16 However, this ethnic
diversity has often created an environment in which racism and
discrimination have flourished, as 62evidenced by the enslavement and
segregation of African-Americans.1

In recent years, the number of hate-related crimes has dramatically
increased. Although it is difficult to predict the number and extent of
hate crimes with accuracy, dramatic incidents combined with subsequent
governmental responses, such as the Hate Crime Statistics Act, indicate
a clear and present crisis. 163 A recent report found that "most
157. German Court Narrows Definition of "IncitingRacial Hatred," CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 17,
1994, at 3 [hereinafter German Court Narrows Definition].
158. Id.
159. Miller, supra note 152, at 1.
160. Whitney, supra note 156, at 13A. As stated by Michael Friedmann, a German lawyer
whose parents survived the Holocaust: "The decision is a wrong signal at a time when right-wing
radicals are trying to relativize history." Miller, supra note 152, at 1. The German Federal Minister
of Justice disagreed and noted that the German government had introduced a bill to strengthen and
clarify German criminal law dealing with right extremism by making it easier to convict under the
"inciting racial hatred" standard. German Court Narrows Definition, supra note 157, at 3.
161. Donald A. Downs, RacialIncitement Law and Policyin the UnitedStates: Drawingthe Line
between Free Speech and Protection against Racism in UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE WEIMAR:
DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES 107-08 (Louis Greenspan & Cyrill

Levitt eds., 1993).
162. Id. at 107.
163. In 1990, President George Bush signed into law the Hate Crime Statistics Act, which
requires collection of data on crimes committed by reason of race, religion, national origin, or sexual
orientation. The Act states in part:
(b)(l) Under the authority of section 534 of title 28, United States Code, the Attorney
General shall acquire data, for the calendar year 1990 and each of the succeeding 4
calendar years, about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on age, religion,
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incidents ... [involve] vandalism like the scrawling of 'K.K.K.' on doors
and walls or harassing phone calls and letters. While most cases did not
result in physical harm to the minority families . . .they had a serious
emotional impact."''
Still, hate crimes are not just limited to vandalism. Indeed, many
involve violent acts. In 1990, for example, the Southern Poverty Law
Center found twenty murders that were "linked to white supremacist or
'
This number was triple the 1989 total and
motivated by violence"165
the most reported in the Center's ten-year history of recording such
Further, these numbers probably underestimate the
incidents.' 66
problem, as many incidents are not reported. 167 In January 1993, much
of what these reports suggested was confirmed with the release of the
first FBI hate crimes report. 68 The compiled statistics for 1994 found
that approximately 7684 bias-motivated offenses were committed,
including 2776 incidents of intimidation, 15 rapes, 2800 assaults, and 20
murders. 169 In reaction to such a rapid escalation of hate crimes, state
and federal authorities have taken action to curb and punish bias-related
crimes. As a result, it becomes necessary to examine the various
sanctions available under U.S. law.

sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder, nonnegligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, intimidation; arson; and
destruction, damage or vandalism of property...
(5) The Attorney General shall publish an annual summary of the data acquired
under this section.
Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. 101-275, § l(b)(1), 104 Stat. 140 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534
note (1993)).
164. Downs, supra note 161, at 108 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1990).
165. Id. Private organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center and the AntiDefamation League have compiled data on hate crimes. Id. at 108-09. The Southern Poverty Law
Center reported a "dramatic rise in hate crimes" in recent years, in particular housing-related incidents
which constituted 75% of the federal prosecutions in 1988 and 1989. Id. Such figures increased
50% from previous years. Id. at 109 (citing 1991 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER REPORT 2
(1991)). The Center also reported a 50% increase in cross bumings, a 33% increase in religious
vandalism, and a 22% increase in violent assaults. Downs, supra note 161, at 109 (citing 1991
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER REPORT 4 (1991)). The Anti-Defamation League, which tracks
anti-Semitic violence, reported 324 incidents of crimes of assaults, threats, and harassments in 1987.
Id. at 109.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, _ U.S. _., 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2198 n.4 (1993).
169. Hate Crimes: New FederalReport has Some Large Holes, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 13,
1994, at 8A (quoting U.S. F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh and 1993 F.B.I. report issued pursuant to Hate
Crimes Act).
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B. Bias Crimes in the United States Legal System
Prior to 1980, only five states had any type of statute related to bias
crime.170 Today, approximately thirty states have enacted measures
dealing with bias crime. 7 ' Furthermore, in 1992, federal legislation
concerning bias crimes passed the House of Representatives but failed to

170. Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: PunishingBias
Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 673, 680 (1993). Virginia, North
Carolina, Connecticut, Georgia, and Florida enacted statutes mainly designed to combat the Klu Klux
Klan and as such, these statutes primarily address cross burnings and wearing of hoods or masks in
public. Id. at 680 n.32.
171. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1991) ("Interference with exercise of civil
rights"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West 1991) ("Aggravating factors for punishment"); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West Supp. 1994) ("Ethnic intimidation"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-37a (West 1994) ("Ridicule on account of race, creed, or color"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3112.2
(1991) ("Defacing or burning cross or religious symbol; display of certain emblems"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.085 (West 1990) ("Evidencing prejudice while committing offense"); IDAHO CODE § 187902 (1991) (making criminal harassment based on race, color, religion); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.2c
(West 1992) ("Assault in violation of individual rights"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 712.9 (West 1992)
(establishing penalty enhancement statute); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1992) (defining hate
crimes for use in this and other statutes); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17, § 2931 (West Supp. 1994)
(proscribing harassment of person exercising free rights); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 470A (1989)
("Crimes against religious property, institutions, or persons"); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 39 (Supp.
1994) ("Assault and battery for purposes of intimidation"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.147b (1991)
("Ethnic intimidation - causes or threatens harm to person or property motivated by race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin"); MO. REV. STAT. § 574.090 (1989) ("Ethnic intimidation in the
first degree"); MO. REv. STAT. § 574.093 (1989) ("Ethnic intimidation in the second degree");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1992) (outlining malicious intimidation or harassment relating to
civil or human rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-222 (1992) (providing sentence enhancement for
offenses committed because of victim's race); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(g) (providing for
extended terms of imprisonment for crimes motivated by hostility toward race or religion); N.J. REv.
STAT. § 2C:33-11 (1992) ("Defacement or damage of property by placement of symbol"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (Supp. 1994) (designating criteria for sentencing defendants acting with ill will,
hatred, or bias due to race, color, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.31 (McKinney 1989) (providing that personal or property damage based on race is aggravated
assault in the first degree); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1987) ("Ethnic intimation");
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (1990) ("Malicious intimidation or harassment because of race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability"); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.155 (1990) ("Intimidation
in the second degree"); PA CONS. STAT. § 2710 (1991) (defining ethnic intimidation as any crime
with malicious intent due to race); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-3 (1991) ("Ethnic or religious
intimidation"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-53-2 (1991) (prohibiting burning crosses, displaying Nazi
swastikas, with intent to threaten); RMl.GEN. LAWS § 11-53-3 (1991) ("Threats to immigrants");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (1991) ("Civil rights intimidation"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3
(Supp. 1994) ("Penalty for Hate Crimes - Civil Rights Violation"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455
(1991) (increasing penalties for violations of other crimes committed with a racist motivation);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 1991) (prohibiting intimidation because of race,
including cross-burning or defacing with swastika etc.); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1991) (prohibiting
violations of an individuals civil rights, injury or intimidation, based on race, religion, etc.); W. VA.
CODE § 61-6-22 (1991) ("Wearing masks, hoods or face coverings"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645
(West 1991) ("Crimes committed against certain people or property").
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pass the Senate.' 72 Consequently, prosecution of hate crimes is solely
based upon state law.'
These hate crime laws may be classified into
two categories: (1) pure bias crimes and (2) penalty enhancement laws.
Pure bias criminal statutes prohibit certain racially-motivated behavior
that is directed at a person or property. 7 4 Such statutes act as "freestanding criminal prohibitions of racially-targeted violence."' 7 5 In
contrast, penalty enhancement statutes increase the severity of criminal
punishment when a crime is committed with racial motivation. 176 The
U.S. .Supreme Court appears to have embraced this distinction in
addressing the constitutionality of both types of statutes. In R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul,177 the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that
was essentially a pure bias criminal statute. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell,'7 8
the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision and upheld the
validity of a penalty enhancement statute. As a result, each decision must
be critically examined in order to determine the status of hate crime laws
in the United States. In addition, it must be recognized that any type of
hate crime statute necessarily implicates First Amendment rights because
such statutes confront racist expression. Thus, a brief analysis of First
Amendment law is necessary as the validity of each statute involves
intricate free speech elements.
1. FirstAmendment and Hate Crimes.-Fewcountries in the world
provide as great a protection to free speech, and consequently racist
speech, as the United States. This protection is rooted in the First
Amendment,'79 which places the right to free speech above societal
interest in prohibiting offensive expression.'
Such an approach is
premised upon the view that "[t]he law deems it inappropriately
paternalistic for the state to abridge politically relevant speech because of
disapproval of its content or undifferentiated concern about its potential

172. See H.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S.2522, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See
also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2197 n.4 (1993).
173. There are federal prohibitions against racially motivated interference with certain legal
rights, however. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1988) (proscribing force or intimidation against a victim
because of the victim's race and because the victim is engaged in voting, participating in or enjoying
a government benefit, applying for or enjoying employment, or serving or attending a court
proceeding); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (proscribing disparate punishment of persons based upon race
or national origin).
174. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 682.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177.
U.S. ___ 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
178.
U.S. ___ 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993).
179. U.S. CONST. amend.1.
180. Downs, supra note 161, at 110.
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to influence the acts of others."''
However, the right to free speech
is not absolute and in certain contexts the regulation of speech has been
deemed constitutional. Thus, these contexts must be examined in order
to determine the degree of protection afforded verbal assaults in the
context of bias crimes. Particularly relevant to such an analysis are the
doctrines of "clear and present danger" and "fighting words."
The constitutional law regarding hate crimes originated in the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions regarding the prosecutions of individuals whose
speech threatened to disrupt the draft during the First World War." 2
For a number of years, Courts allowed speech restrictions provided there
was a "clear and present danger" to society.' 83 Initially, this was
interpreted by the Court to require that the speech have a "dangerous
tendency" to lead to unlawful action. 8 4 This standard was restricted
over time, culminating with the case of Brandenburgv. Ohio."5 In that
case, Brandenburg, a leader of a Klu Klux Klan group, filmed a rally at
a farm in Ohio and later broadcasted it on the local and national
networks. 8 6 He was convicted under an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
statute for "advocat[ing] . . . crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform" and for "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism.""'I 7 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and held that guarantees of free speech do not allow "a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."'8 8 The Court
developed this distinction by recalling an earlier case that stated that "the
mere abstract teaching ...of the moral propriety or even moral necessity
for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group

181. Id.
182. Id. at 112.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
186. Id. at445.
187. Id. at444-45 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.13). From 1917 to 1920,20 states
and
two territories adopted similar or identical statutes. Id. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act.
However, in Brandenberg, Whitney was overturned. Id.at 447. See also Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951), reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 842 (1951); reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 936 (1958)
(criticizing Whitney). See also ELDRIDGE FOSTER DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM
LEGISLATION INTHE UNITED STATES (1939).
188. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at447.
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for violent action and steeling it to such action."' 8 9 Thus, it appears
that the "clear and present danger" standard, as applied to hate crimes,
requires speech that is likely to cause or incite immediate violence.
The U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine of"fighting words"
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.9 ' In that case, the Court upheld a
conviction under a New Hampshire ordinance that made it illegal to
"call ... [anyone] by any offensive or derisive name, [or] make any
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride,
offend or annoy him."'' The Court stated that there are "certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or 'fighting' words."'
The Court limited its
interpretation of "fighting words" to apply to any "words plainly likely
to cause a breach of the peace."' 93
Over the course of several decades, the doctrine of "fighting words,"
like the "clear and present danger" standard, was also restricted. In
Cohen v. California,9 4 the Court articulated a standard that required a
person to direct "personally abusive epithets" at a specific individual.' 95
This standard was further limited in Lewis v. City of New Orleans,96
which implied that a physical confrontation may be necessary to invoke
the doctrine of "fighting words."' 97 Thus, the possibility of invoking
the "fighting words" doctrine as a statutory basis for curtailing racist or
offensive words appears to be limited.
Despite the constriction of the doctrines of "clear and present
danger" and "fighting words," several states have maintained statutes that
restrict offensive and racist expression. Such statutes have been the
subject of two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the
constitutional validity of hate crime statutes.

189. Id. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)); Hemdon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242, 259-61 (1937); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134 (1966)).
190. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
191. Id. at 568.
192. Id. at 571-72.
193. Id. at 573.
194. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971). See generally Note, The Demise
of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for its Internment, 106 HARV. L. Rev.
1129 (1993).
195. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
196. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
197. Id. at 134-35.
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2.
R.A. V. v. City of St.Paul and Pure Bias Criminal
Statutes.-R.A. V. v. City of St Paul was the first case in which the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of prohibitions on racist
expression. In R.A. V, Robert Victora, then a juvenile, burned a cross in
the yard of an African-American family that had recently moved into the
neighborhood. 9 ' Viktora was charged with violating the St. Paul BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance, which stated:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to,
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'99
Viktora claimed the ordinance was invalid under the First Amendment
because it was overbroad and an impermissible content-based restriction
on speech."' ° The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the overbreadth
challenge, interpreting the language "arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others" to reach only "fighting words." Thus, the court held that the
ordinance reached only expression "that the First Amendment does not
protect.120' The court also found that the ordinance was not
impermissibly content-based as "the ordinance [was] a narrowly tailored
means toward accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in
protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to public safety
and order.,

20 2

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled to abolish the
ordinance. However, the Court split 5-4 upon the appropriate grounds for
its decision. 0 3 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, established that

198. __ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
199. Id. at 2541 (citing St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, MINN. LEGIs. CODE § 292.02
(1990)).
200. Id. at 2541.
201. In re Welfare R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), cert. granted, 501 U.S. 1204
(1991); rev'd,_ U.S. __ 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)). The Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon
an interpretation of the statute in a prior case, In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978).
In each case, the court invoked the Chaplinsky doctrine of "fighting words," which amounts to
"conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence.. " Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 572.
202. 464 N.W.2d at 511.
203. R.A. V.,112 S.Ct. at 2541. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas joined. Justice White filed
a concurring opinion in judgment joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. Justice Stevens joined
Justice White's opinion in part and filed a separate concurring opinion joined in part by Justices
White and Blackmun. Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. See generally
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several categories of speech, such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting
words may be regulated "because of their constitutionally proscribable
content."2"4 However, Scalia did stipulate that such expression is not
"entirely indivisible to the Constitution" and does deserve some
protection.2"'
Consequently, these types of expression may be
proscribed in a categorical nature but not on the grounds of their
content. °6 As Justice Scalia explained, "[Flighting words are ...
analogous to a noisy sound truck" in that each is a "mode of
expression.""2 7 That is, each may convey an idea, but neither is in and
of itself entitled to First Amendment protection.20 Yet, in each case
"the government may not regulate use based upon hostility - or
favoritism - to the underlying message expressed. 20 9
Applying this analysis to the St. Paul ordinance, Justice Scalia found
the ordinance facially unconstitutional, as categorically, the ordinance
affected "fighting words," a mode of expression not protected by the First
Amendment., 2 10 Upon closer look, however, the Court found that the
ordinance applied only to "fighting words" affecting race, color, creed,
religion, or gender.'
Indeed, the ordinance failed to include
prohibitions on other hostile expressions, such as those directed toward
political affiliation, union membership or homosexuality. As such, the
Court found the ordinance imposed special prohibitions on certain
disfavored subjects and in that regard, was unconstitutional
as an
21 2
impermissible content-based restriction on speech.
After KA. V v. St. Paul, it appears that "pure bias crime" laws will
be unconstitutional if they regulate the expression that conveys racist
Thomas H. Moore, R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to Protect Free Speech, 71 N.C. L.
REv. 1252 (1993); J. Lim, RA.
v. City of St. Paul: Casting Aside of First Amendment Stare
Decisis, 24 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 275 (1993); Bruce A. Grabow, RA. V. v. City of St. Paul:
Dismantling Free Speech Jurisprudence to Make Room for Equal Treatment, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
577 (1993); Andrea L. Crowley, R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul: How the Supreme Court Missed the
Writing on the Wall, 34 B.C. L. REv. 771 (1993); Tracy Lynne Hulsey, R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul:
The Right Decision, Flawed Reasoning, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1015 (1993); Michael Sandberg,
Responding to Bias Crimes in America, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 961 (1992).
204. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
205. Id.
206. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 687.
207. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2545 (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 283 (1951)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2547.
211. Id.
212. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547. The concurring opinions of the minority disagreed with Justice
Scalia's analysis and would have found the St. Paul ordinance unconstitutional because it was
overbroad and "criminalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected by the First
Amendment."
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messages, as such prohibitions are content-basedrestrictions. However,
in R.A. V., the Court did suggest that such statutes may be constitutional
provided they regulate the mode of expression, such as prohibiting racist
expression because it is communicated in a threatening manner.
3. Wisconsin v. Mitchell and Penalty Enhancement Statutes.-The
day after the R.A. V v. City of St.Paul decision was announced, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the state's penalty enhancement hate
crime law was unconstitutional in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.213 . In that
case, Mitchell, a nineteen-year-old black man, and several other black
youths gathered at an apartment complex and discussed a scene from the
movie "Mississippi Burning," in which a white man beats a black boy
who was praying.21 4 Shortly thereafter, a young white man walked by
the group on the opposite side of the street.2" 5 The group descended
upon the white youth and beat him severely, rendering him unconscious
and in a coma for four days.2" 6 Mitchell was convicted of aggravated
assault and his sentence was increased because he had intentionally
selected his victim on the basis of race, thereby violating the Wisconsin
penalty enhancement statute.21 7

213. 485 N.W.2d 807 (1992), cert. granted,__ U.S. ___ 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992); rev'd, __
U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993).
214. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). After leaving the apartment complex, Mitchell asked his friends:
"Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?" Id. at 2196.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2197.
217. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at2197. In Wisconsin, the offense of aggravated battery usually carries
a maximum of a two year sentence of imprisonment. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.19(1 m), 939.50(3)(e).
Under the penalty enhancement statute, discussed in this case, the possible term of imprisonment was
increased to seven years. The Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute provided:
(i) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crimes are
increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is
committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of
that property.
(2) (a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor other than a
Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised
maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county jail.
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the
penalty increase under this section changes the status of the crime to a felony and
the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of
imprisonment is 2 years.
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum fine prescribed
by law for the crime may be increased by law for the crime may be increased by not
more than $5,000 and the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that
the statute "violates the First Amendment directly by punishing what the
legislature has deemed to be offensive thought."2 1 The Court cited the
recent R.A. V. decision and added: "[T]he Wisconsin legislature cannot
'
In addition, the
criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees." 219
Wisconsin Supreme Court held the statute was overbroad since it would
require evidentiary use of protected speech in order to establish that the
defendant intentionally selected his victim on the basis of race.22 ° This
would have a "chilling effect" upon those who feared prosecution under
the offenses covered by the penalty enhancement.22 '
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that Mitchell's
First Amendment rights had not been violated by the penalty
enhancement statute.222 The Court first rejected the contention that the
statute was invalid because it punished a defendant's discriminatory
motive. 23 Referring to an earlier decision, the Court established that
"the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of
evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply
because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First
Amendment., 224 As a result, the Court held that the First Amendment
does not prohibit the evidentiary use of defendant's motive or intent,

the crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable for the
underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to
all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that crime.
WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90). The statute was amended effective 1992, but such amendments
were not at issue in this case. Amended Section (1)(b) provides:
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed
or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise accepted by the crime under par. (a)
in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner
or occupant of that property, whether or not the actors belief or perception was correct.
WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (1990). Mitchell, 113 S.'Ct. at 2197 n.I. Mitchell was sentenced to four
years imprisonment. Id. at 2197.
218. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 811.
219. Id. at 815.
220. Id. at 816.
221. Id. Two dissenting justices argued that the statute punished discriminatory acts, not beliefs,
and thus, was constitutional. Id. at 819, 821-25.
222. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2202.
223. Id. at 2199-2200.
224. Id. at 2200 (citing Delaware v. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1094, on remand, 637 A.2d 57
(Del. Super. Ct. 1992)).
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provided such use is designed to prove more than the defendant's abstract
beliefs.22
Next, the Court distinguished Mitchell from R.A. V. on the basis of
the type of ordinance involved. The Court explained that the ordinance
in St. Paul was invalid because it proscribed a class of "fighting words"
found offensive by the city, which consequently violated the First
Amendment rule against content-based discrimination. 26 In contrast,
the Wisconsin statute was aimed at conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment.2 27 The Court elaborated on this distinction by explaining
the purposes of the statute. The Court explained that "the Wisconsin
statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this
conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. 228
As such, the Court found that the state's desire to protect against the
effects of bias-motivated crime, such as retaliatory crimes, distinct
emotional harms, and community unrest, went beyond mere disagreement
with offender's beliefs or biases and therefore, provided an adequate basis
to uphold the statute. 229 Finally, the Court summarily dismissed any
"chilling effect" the statute may have had upon free speech on the
grounds that such a claim was too attenuated and speculative.230
In assessing R.A. V. and Mitchell, it is clear that the Supreme Court
distinguished between the two types of hate crime statutes on the basis of
First Amendment interpretations.
In RA. V., the Court declared
unconstitutional a pure bias crime statute because it proscribed only a
certain class of "fighting words" that violated the First Amendment rule
of content-neutral regulation. In Wisconsin, the penalty enhancement
statute was upheld, as it did not regulate speech but conduct. In
considering this conduct, courts are free to consider evidence of motive,
such as racist beliefs, in determining the criminal sentence. However, use
of such evidence may not be aimed at establishing abstract beliefs. Thus,
presumably, the Supreme Court has, at least temporarily, settled the much
debated issue of hate crime statutes and the First Amendment.

225. Id. That is, "a defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be
taken into consideration by a sentencing judge." Id.
226. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2200-01.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2201.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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V. International Human Rights Laws and Hate Crimes
In addition to the domestic laws of the United States and Germany,
international human rights law provides a possible basis for sanctioning
hate crimes. Two treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights2 3' and the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,232 contain provisions that may
be applicable to the problem of hate crime.
A. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
Both the United States and Germany are parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.233 For the most part, the
Covenant's text concerns traditional political rights, with considerable
emphasis upon the themes of equality and non-discrimination.234
Consequently, many of the treaty's provisions are relevant to the issue of
hate crimes. In fact, three articles are particularly relevant because they
deal with both racial hatred and freedom of expression, two crucial issues
in bias-related crimes.
The first, article 20(2) of the Covenant provides: "Any advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to

231. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21.
232. "Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 22.
233. The Federal Republic of Germany signed the Covenant on October 6, 1968 and ratified it
on December 17, 1973. GENEVA CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 26 (United Nations eds., 1987) [hereinafter CENTRE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS]. The United States signed the Covenant on October 5, 1977 and ratified it on June 8, 1992.
Carter, US Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 29, 1992,
at 19.
234. The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights protects the right to life (article 6);
prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 7); prohibits slavery,
the slave trade, servitude and compulsory labor (article 8); prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention
(article 9); provides that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity (article
10); prohibits imprisonment on grounds of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation. (article 11);
provides for liberty of movement (article 12); provides for equality before the courts and for
guarantees in criminal procedures (article 14); prohibits retroactive criminal procedures (article 15);
provides for the right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law (article 16);
prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence and
unlawful attacks on honor and reputation (article 17); provides for freedom of thought, conscience
and religion (article 18); provides for the right to join trade unions (article 22); protects the family
(article 23); protects children (article 24); protects the right and the opportunity to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections by universal and
equal suffrage held by secret ballot, and to have access on general terms of equality to public service
in his country (article 25); provides equality before the law (article 26) and protects minorities (article
27). Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21. See also B.G. RAMCHARAN, EQUALITY
AND NONDISCRIMINATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 250 (Louis

Henkin ed., 1981).
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discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."23 This
article serves to prohibit the type of conduct that is often associated with
a hate crime.
Article 20(2) is supplemented by article 5(l), which prohibits any
State, group or person from undertaking "any activity or perform[ing] any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
herein [the Covenant] or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for in the present Covenant."236 Thus, article 20(2) combined
with article 5(1) appears to proscribe any State, group, or person from
engaging in bias-related activity, as this would violate many of the rights
contained in the Covenant.
Implicit in the consideration of hate crimes is the concept of speech
and expression. The Covenant covers these issues in article 19, which
states:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.237
This right, however, is accompanied with "special duties and
responsibilities" that allows for certain restrictions to the right of speech,
provided such restrictions are necessary to (1) respect the rights or
reputations of others; or (2) protect national security, public order or
public health or morality.238 The combination of articles 19, 20, and
5 effectively prohibits any conduct that may be associated with the
commission of a bias-related crime. Moreover, these provisions prohibit
racial hatred and limit the freedom of expression in such a manner as to
allow countries to prevent racist speech.
The strength of these provisions is compounded by article 2, which
establishes state parties' obligations under the Covenant. Article 2(1)
specifically states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinctions of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,

235.
236.
237.
238.

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 20(2).
Id. art. 5(1).
Id. art. 19(2).
Id. art. 19(2).
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political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
239
other status.

This subsection is complemented by article 2(2), which requires each
State party "to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant., 240 The result of article 2 is that upon ratification, a State
must immediately take necessary steps to implement the provisions of the
Covenant. In essence, parties to the Convention have an affirmative
obligation to institute legislative measures that operate to eliminate biasrelated crimes.
Both the United States and Germany have voiced reservations about
the effect of the relevant bias-related crime provisions. Germany has
entered a reservation that states that "[a]rticles 19, 21 and 22 in
conjunction with article 2(1) of the Covenant shall be applied within the
scope of article 16 of the [European] Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950. ' '24I
Interestingly enough, article 16 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms allows the High
Contracting Parties to impose restrictions on the political activity of
aliens.242 It appears that perhaps Germany foresaw the possibility of a
right extremism resurgence from outside sources and included a
reservation that would allow it to prevent such a possibility in the
political arena. Thus, Germany appears to have enacted this reservation
with the prospect of preventing racist activity in the political arena by
ensuring the right to check any such political activity.
The United States recognized that a conflict existed between the
First Amendment and article 20.243 Consequently, the United States
entered a reservation which states: "Article 20 does not authorize or
require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict
the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and

239. Id. art. 2(1).
240. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 2(2).
241. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 233, at 36. Articles 21 and 22 of the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights confer the right to peacefully assemble, and article 19 concerns

the right to freedom of expression. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, arts. 19,
20, 21.
242.
1992).
243.
I.
2.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC TEXTS 166 (Council of Europe Press ed.,
Article 20 specifically provides:
Any propaganda for war shall be limited by law.
Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to

discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 20.
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the laws of the United States. 244 Such a reservation was necessary, as
both R.A. V and Mitchell established that the First Amendment protects
speech that may be contrary to the terms of article 20. Arguably, this
reservation may be interpreted as a violation of several provisions of the
Covenant because it protects racist speech. However, the recent Mitchell
decision upholding penalty enhancement statues allows the United States
to enact legislation that complies with the Covenant by effectively dealing
with hate crimes through the alternate method of penalty enhancement
statutes.
B. InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
Presently, only Germany is a party to the Convention, although it
appears that the United States is close to ratifying it.245
The
Convention proscribes racial discrimination, which it defines as "any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based upon race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin" which nullifies or impairs "the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life.

'246

The Covenant establishes a series of

broad political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights similar in nature
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. 247 These

244. 102 CONG. REC. S4781-84 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992). See generally David Stewart, U.S.
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 77 (1993).
245. Germany signed the Covenant on February 10, 1967 and ratified it on May 16, 1969.
CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 233, at 36. The United States signed the Covenant on
September 28, 1966 and is preparing for ratification. Id. at 96.
246. Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, art. 1(1).
247. Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination provides:
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in Article 2 of this Convention,
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms
and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national
or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following
rights:
(a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs
administering justice;
(b) The right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or
bodily harm, whether inflicted by government official or by any individual group
or institution;
(c) Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections -to vote and to
stand for election- on the basis of universal and equal suffrage to take part in the
Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have
equal access to public service;
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rights are supported by an affirmative obligation of the state to prohibit
and eliminate racial discrimination with regards to governmental
authorities as well as prohibiting "by all appropriate means, including
legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any
persons, group or organization."24
This obligation is increasingly
significant when viewed under the dictates of article 4, which provides:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of
persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or
promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake
to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end...
(a) Shall declare an offence [sic] punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or
group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and
also the provision of any assistance to racist activities,
including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and
also organized and all other propaganda activities, which
(d) Other civil rights, in particular:
(i) the right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the
State;
(ii) the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's
country;
(iii) the right of nationality;
(iv) the right to marriage and choice of spouse;
(v) the right to own property alone as well as in association with others;
(vi) the right to inherit;
(vii) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
(viii) the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
(ix)the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
(e) economic, social and cultural rights, in particular:
(i) the rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable
conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal
work, to just and favourable remuneration;
(ii) the right to form and join trade unions;
(iii) the right to public housing;
(iv)the right to public health, medical care, social security and social services;
(v) the right to education and training;
(vi) the right to equal participation in cultural activities;
(f)
the right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public,
such as transport, hotels, restaurants, cafes, theaters and parks.
Id. art. 5.
248. Id. art. 2.
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promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall
recognize participation in such organization or activities as
an offence punishable by law.. .249
Article 4 is somewhat unique in the field of international human rights
law, as it directs states to enact comprehensive laws explicitly designed
to eliminate all activity that incites racial hatred. As a result, upon
ratification, a state undertakes a significant obligation to eliminate racial
discrimination and, with it, the vestige of hate crimes.
Germany appears to have implemented legislation sufficient to meet
the obligations of the Convention. German laws dealing with racial
hatred, such as article 130 of the Criminal Code, appear to satisfy the
dictates of article 2 of the Convention.25 ° In addition, it appears that
Germany has complied with article 4 of the Convention, as German
courts may deem unconstitutional political parties and organizations that
attempt to incite racial hatred and may impose sanctions for disseminating
propaganda pursuant to articles 86 and 86a of the German Criminal
Code.25 '
The United States appears to have the necessary elements in its
comprehensive civil rights laws to satisfy the requirements of article 2 of
the Convention. However, article 4 of the Convention is in direct conflict
with the First Amendment, as the First Amendment protects racist
propaganda and organizations. Perhaps the United States will enact a
reservation similar to the one used in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. It may be argued that such reservations defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty and hence, is a violation of international
law. Still, the U.S. civil rights laws provide adequate remedies to address
any concerns that may arise in regards to article 4. Nevertheless, U.S.
ratification would be a significant step in the struggle against racial
discrimination for a country long haunted by such a specter.
VI. Conclusion
The United States and Germany both share an unfortunate legacy of
hatred manifested in racial discrimination and bias-related crimes. In
response to such a past, the United States and Germany have undertaken
significant measures to eradicate the evils associated with hatred that have
increasingly manifested themselves in hate crimes.

249. Id. art. 4. See generally Michael A.J. Korengold, Lessons in Confronting Racist Speech:
Good Intentions, Bad Results, and Article 4(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 77 MINN. L. REV. 719 (1993).
250. See supra part III.D.2.
251. See supra part III.D.I.
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A comparative analysis of the German and United States hate crime
laws reveals that the one major difference between the two lies in the
varying conceptions of freedom of speech. The First Amendment
precludes the United States from undertaking measures to ban racist
expression. This was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, which declared unconstitutional an attempt to
proscribe hate speech.252
Germany is not subject to such demanding requirements in its
protection of free speech. Indeed, the German Criminal Code affords its
protection beyond the limits of speech. For example, article 130 of the
German Criminal Code prohibits incitement of racial hatred through
speech." 3 In addition, article 130 prohibits the dissemination of racist
writings.254 Articles 86 and 86a provide mechanisms for the prohibition
of political parties and their symbols that may be deemed capable of
inciting racial hatred.255 Finally, article 194,
"the lie of Auschwitz"
25 6
offense, prohibits the denial of the Holocaust.
Accordingly, while Germany has undertaken a wide array of
provisions designed to prohibit any form of racial hatred, such measures
would not be constitutional in the United States. As a result, the United
States has implemented an alternative approach, penalty enhancement,
which the Supreme Court has recently affirmed is consistent with the
U.S. Constitution in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.257
It is difficult to argue which country's approach is most effective.
Admittedly, the German approach facially covers a much broader array
of topics in its attempts to eradicate the German legacy of racial hatred.
Yet, the United States, limited in its methods by the terms of its
Constitution, had nevertheless enacted measures that at their core,
effectively punish and deter hate crimes. As such, both German and the
United States appear to have enacted comprehensive schemes for dealing
with hate crimes, while staying within the bounds of their respective
constitutional systems.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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